Barca: keys to understanding how more than 800 million were lost between 2019 and 2022
- The club is on track to close 2021-2022 with losses close to 150 million euros. The sports policy of Bartomeu's board has generated the bulk of the hole, which Laporta has widened with the failed sale of assets and sponsorships.
- The bulk of the losses are attributable to the previous board, whose sports policy strained the seams of the organization and they just broke with Covid-19, when ordinary revenues sank more than 25%.
- Why has Madrid fared the storm much better than Barca, without incurring any losses at all in the last several years? The reason is none other than the non-dependence on transfers to balance the accounts and a planning that was always based more on signings than on the quarry, so that there was always some stability in what percentage of the expenditure was allocated to signings and which to the payment of sports salaries. A balance that in the offices of the Camp Nou was destroyed in the summer of 2017, with the departure of Neymar to PSG.
- After Neymar's transfer to PSG in 2017 for 222m, the club squandered the money with that sale in a series of signings and renewals out of the market, which in a year increased the wage bill by more than 200 million; specifically, it went from 432 million in 2016-2017 to 639 million euros in 2017-2018. The increase occurred on all fronts, doubling the expenditure on amortizations for signings and increasing by 42% the amount allocated to payroll. After years in which Madrid always spent more on sports staff, Barca passed him widely, with a difference of 138 million euros, which in 2018-2019 shot up to 185 million and in the following two years stood at around 90 million. This, despite the fact that Madrid assumed during many of those campaigns the bonuses associated with victories in the Champions League. Additionally, the board chaired by Florentino Perez only works with certain income, that is, those that it has guaranteed in the month of August or with prudent estimates in terms of matchday and commercial. That maxim was also applied by Bartomeu, until the post-Neymar stage forced to take to the limit the rules of economic control of La Liga. In this case, Neymar's high capital gains were used to always budget more money for transfers than had been achieved.
- One of the most difficult comparisons to explain is why Madrid managed to get football and basketball players to agree to reduce by 10% in the first two years marked by the pandemic, while Barca only managed to reduce the 60 million euros for the months of inactivity during the confinement and everything else was deferrals. It is a question that Bartomeu did not know how to solve, nor the management board that took the reins during the electoral period, nor Laporta himself, who at first chose to agree on deferrals or salary reductions complemented by contract extensions.
- Laporta's practice of fattening the losses of last season further reduced the margin to register players.
- Apparently Fanatics and Investindustrial had withdrawn their offer of 200 million euros for BLM, after Laporta's claims that it was undervalued (which by his estimate should be above 300 million).
- As soon as Ferran Reveter resigned and his people were fired by Laporta, negotiations on the CVC deal resumed with the treasurer and Laporta's trusted second man in command at the club, Ferran Olive taking the lead, as well as Mateu Alemany, who maintains a close relationship with Tebas.
https://www.2playbook.com/clubes/ba...as-800-millones-entre-2019-2022_8552_102.html